Link drop November 2017

"Saudi Arabia’s Incompetence Would Be Comical If It Weren’t Killing So Many People"

"Navy grounds two aviators behind penis skydrawing"
This reminds me of remarks about how 18 year olds are allowed to kill and die in war in the U.S., but not allowed to drink alcohol. There's an inordinate amount of immature crap in a normal military, and almost all of it is harmless IIRC.

"Over-friendly, or sexual harassment? It depends partly on whom you ask"
This is about liberty; both society norms and laws can reduce the freedom of action, which equals a loss of some freedom. It's interesting how laid-back Germany is, though some people would probably call that chauvinistic (females in Germany are more laid-back as well according to the poll, though).
I suppose looking at boobs and other female curves is hard-coded male (non-gay) behaviour and a line between sexual harassment and things that one has to accept as a price for being alive has to be drawn someplace before that's getting people in trouble. We should probably draw that line even before sexually charged compliments, for the very same words are very different in their perception depending on how attractive the speaker is.

"Level IV Armor, and the Future of Small Arms: Brief Thoughts 001"
Disasters like this happen when firearms fans think about infantry combat. Infantry combat is NOT all about infantry killing each other. In fact, there's lots of evidence that infantry repels infantry to some degree, and almost all killing (80+ %) is done by other arms in modern conventional warfare.
Infantry that's optimised to resist opposing infantry's bullets while penetrating opposing infantry's armour plates won't make much sense until exoskeletons become practical and affordable en masse.

"What Do We Mean When We Say ‘Fight For  Information’?"
Just an example of U.S. professional military journals trying to foster thought about doctrine even on a published platform. The majority of military theory writing before 1914 was likely written in German with a gazillion of Prussian, German and Austro-Hungarian military journal editions, books and widely circulated memos. It appears that the effort put into getting military doctrine right is nowadays much smaller. This is horrifying because even after all that effort the officers of the 1900's still erred badly and mostly blundered into the First World War.

A new training centre in Germany for training in settlements of different types, including sewers. It's still missing a lot of clutter, especially furnitures, balconies and fences.

Multi-mode radar with 360° field of view and on-the-move operation in a small package. The concept justified high hopes (except that "low cost" was a ridiculous claim coming from Northrop Grumman), but it's been years since and there's still no series production. A brigade designed on a blank sheet would certainly have something like this, but path dependencies and other reasons make sure NATO armies don't have many nice things like that. Personally, I wonder if the Swedish SAAB Giraffe 1X could be adapted for on-the-move operation. It should be possible.

"HISTINT: Unearthing declassified Soviet military journals in CIA archives"





People sometimes ask me why I'm interested in U.S. politics.
The answer is always about the same; they start too many bad things there that eventually spill over the Atlantic Ocean and become Europeans' problems, too.

To pay attention provides early warning.




German nuclear participation

There's occasionally a minor debate about whether the Americans should withdraw their about 20 nuclear bombs from Germany. This is more than a debate about the storage location for a handful of nukes; it's a debate about German nuclear participation.

So what's "nuclear participation"?

The nuclear non-proliferation treaty limits which ratifying countries may be nuclear powers and it does also prohibit transfer of control over nukes to non-nuclear powers.
The Cold War arrangement in NATO was the the Americans would hand over nuclear warheads (for example for ballistic Honest John, Lance, Sergeant & Pershing missiles as well as free-fall nuclear bombs) to allied non-nuclear powers such as the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany). This made a lot of sense because in the event of WW3 the NNPT wouldn't matter any more and the Central European front(ier) was divided by nationality of forces. There would have been impractical friction and lags if an American rocket battery or strike fighter wing would have been designated to support a German army corps with battlefield nukes.

Bundeswehr Honest John SRBM with launcher vehicle

What was the (West)German motivation?

The basic law (constitution) of West Germany pretended that the West German government represented all of Germany and East Germany was no state, but a mere Soviet-occupied zone. The FRG government thus strived to represent the interests of East Germans as well. American and British plans to blow up all of East Germany with nukes were not in the best interest of East Germans.
Nor was it in the best interest of West Germans that French, British and Americans planned to blow West Germany up with battlefield nukes in defensive land battles.

To participate in the nuclear warhead delivery chain of events meant to be able to abort it. To provide alternatives to nuclear strikes (such as a strong army and the otherwise rather inexplicable Tornado IDS interdiction role) did help to avoid some nuclear strikes on German soil in the event of WW3.

(From this point of view it might irritate that the Bundeswehr wasn't located in Northern Germany only, opposing East Germany and the Soviet armies there. There are four explanations for the actual locations; 
(1) a conscript army is much more sustainable if the conscripts serve all over the country. Southern Germany would have been pissed if all its conscripts had to serve 100-900 km far from their homes while Northern Germans would serve never farther than 500 km from their homes.
(2) the federal nature of the FRG meant that the Southern German politicians had much influence on this affair, and military bases were considered a good way to help the economy especially in rural areas
(3) the Bundeswehr provided the backbone to all allied forces in West Germany through its territorial (mobilised) army logistical and security forces
(4) the locations of the British and American forces were path dependent on the original occupation zones; Bundeswehr forces were squeezed in between
(5) the early Heer (pre-mid-60's)was quite fragile with training and spare parts issues in particular. It would have been unacceptable to have the entire northern half of the FRG guarded by the Heer alone
(6) the Belgians and Dutch preferred to have their forces not far away in Southern Germany, but in Northern or in the Central FRG.)

It wasn't the only point of view anyway; the early West German minister of defence (insert expression of disgust here) Strauß was all-in on throwing around nukes. He apparently focused on deterrence, not on mitigating how very much devastating WW3 would be to us. This was one of his few reasonable stances, actually.

- - - - -

The original motivation for the German nuclear participation is gone. If WW3 or WW4 still happens in Europe, it would likely begin and have its most extreme effects in Eastern Europe. Germany might still be affected (airbases, airports, Oder river bridges, ports), but not by NATO's nukes. As of now it's fairly unlikely that NATO would nuke locations in Eastern European NATO members even if they were overrun by Russian forces.

I strongly suppose nobody is seriously contemplating to seize the handful of American nukes (B61 bombs) stored in Germany. 

So what's the continued nuclear participation of Germany good for?

I suppose there's no "pro" side here, save for nebulous "transatlantic" ideology.




Square or triangular - my two Euro cents

Yesterday I wrote that I have very little if anything to add to that old debate, so this is a sorry excuse of "very little to add":

Nowadays battalion battlegroups are important as elements of manoeuvre. This begs the question what would a formation of four such battlegroups and one separate support group (with its own security effort) be? It would be rather too big for a brigade and too small for a (Western style) division.

The triangular or square issue may also be overridden by a completely different consideration.
Think of a brigade/division defined as the forces that operate in an area where the brigade/division support assets can cover entirely. Think of for example one area air defence missile battery, or one anti-J-STARS/ASTOR radar jammer, one field hospital with a radius of acceptable MEDEVAC/CASEVAC delays, or in an extreme case of motorcycle messengers as backup for jammed radio comms. There are support assets and they may be effective in a radius of for example 40 km.
Furthermore, a certain quantity of battalion battlegroups are a given and a certain area of conflict is given (such as Northeast & Eastern Poland + Lithuania for NATO deterrence/defence) as well.
With these fixated variables you might end up needing 20 divisional/brigade support assets of one kind to cover the region, and have only 43 battalion battlegroups of what's determined as ideal battlegroup size before.
The average would be 2.15, not three or four. The entire triangular or square structure debate would be moot in such a situation unless one is convinced that two support nodes per division and four BGs is the answer in such a case. But what if a different threat scenario leads to 15 support and 45 maneouvre elements?

These figures were arbitrary, but they show that once you look at a higher level and the resources constraints, you might end up with a whole different picture than a mere tactical debate about perfect fantasy formations would yield.

One might instead arrive at a doctrine in which the support nodes are kind of predetermined by the areas, and the manoeuvre elements would fluidly shift between benefiting form one node and then from another one.

This mirrors what I wrote about dedicated reconnaissance assets and how they shouldn't be organic, but rather defined by the theatre size and under theatre command.

Back in 2014 I wrote
An unusually blunt way of reinforcing the point of this text: "The demand for area reconnaissance is exogenous and independent of the strength and quantity of manoeuvre combat formations in the area." Think about this, for its consequences are huge!
Indeed, they are huge once you remember that reconnaissance is but one form of support to manoeuvre elements, and the principle may apply (to some degree) to other forms of support as well!

So in other words I'm moving in circles and merely applying an old idea of mine on a different issue. And that's why I have the feeling to not have anything substantially new to offer here.
Or maybe I have a lot to offer, it all depends on how good the old idea (or observation) actually was. I certainly didn't do much research on the voluminous triangular/square debate, so I could hardly debate someone who researched and wrote a master's thesis on the subject.


P.S.: Clarification; battalion battlegroups are not perfect. Regular companies or mixed ad hoc companies may often be sent on independent missions. There's just not nearly as much combined arms integration in such independently manoeuvring units. They would typically not have organic indirect fire support better than light mortars and very little of engineers' capabilities, for example. On a theatre map it makes sense to pay attention to battalion battlegroups, and ignore whatever unit and small unit ad hoc elements of maneoeuvre these battlegroups dispatch temporarily.


The square structure issue

There's a rare and very interesting category of books on military affairs that appears to be provoked by defeat in war: Veterans who write about the war with the intent to preserve knowledge for a future generation. German WW2 officers - mostly officers who served in higher HQs (such as Middeldorff) - and American Vietnam vet NCOs wrote such books.

These books are unique in touching on aspects that the entertainment books for enthusiasts, research books for historians and official military professional training literature do not cover.

I'll quote one excerpt here that's most interesting. It deals with mechanised infantry / Panzergrenadiere and is from "Die Panzergrenadiere" (1961) written by later Bundeswehr general Dr. F.M. von Senger und Etterlin, a low level aristocrat born into a family with hundreds of years of military tradition.
(German original from page 99 first, BE translation follows)

"Die 3 Grundprobleme

Mechanisierung bedeutet Einsatzmöglichkeit aller Waffen zum Kampf vom Fahrzeug. Mechanisierung bedeutet aber nicht die Aufgabe der Befähigung zu allen Kampfarten im Fußeinsatz. Die harmonische Vereinigung beider Fähigkeiten ist das Ziel der Entwicklung. Dabei ist klar, daß die Kampfweise mit Fahrzeugen  von der Kampfweise zu Fuß erheblich verschieden ist. Jene ist der Kampfweise der Kampfpanzerverbände sehr ähnlich und wickelt sich in der Hauptsache in enger Zusammenarbeit mit diesen ab. Jede Überlegung zur zweckmäßigen Gliederung der Panzergrenadiere wird daher auf die geltenden Grundsätze für die Gliederung von Kampfpanzerverbänden zurückzugreifen haben. Dabei tauchen im wesentlichen drei Hauptprobleme auf.
Einmal bedingt der mechanisierte Kampf erfahrungsgemäß grundsätzlich die Viergliederung, während sich für den Fußkampf die Dreigleiderung bewährt hat. Der Panzerkampf spielt sich zangen- und schachbrettartig ab, zur Raumausnutzung müssen die Verbände auf das ganze Gefechtsfeld verteilt sein und die Ausscheidung von Reserven spielt nicht dieselbe Rolle wie im Fußkampf oder in der Abwehr.
Zum zweiten ist der mechanisierte Kampf vornehmlich Angriffskampf. Das organisatorische Element der schweren Schnellfeuerwaffen in Gestalt von sMG-Einheiten wird hier nicht benötigt. Zudem ist es möglich, die Schützenpanzer mit einer großen Zahl von sMG als Bordwaffen auszustatten. Besondere sMG-Einheiten für den Kampf vom Fahrzeug sind deshalb überflüssig.
Beide Probelme heben sich jedoch gegenseitig auf, indem unter grundsätzlicher Beibehaltung der Viergliederung für den mechanisierten Kampf der vierten Einheit eine Zwitterrolle zugeteilt wird. Beim Übergang zum Fußkampf kann sie nämlich als sMG-Einheit zur Unterstützung der übrigen drei Einheiten auftreten.
Das dritte Problem liegt darin, daß die Gliederung und Ausrüstung zu Fuß kämpfender Infanterie gewöhnlich verhältnismäßig starr zu sein hat, während der mechanisierte Kampf vermöge der Ausstattung mit Panzerfahrzeugen eine weniger starre Gliederung erlaubt. So müssen für den Fußkampf jeder schweren Infanteriewaffe von vorneherein eine gewiße Anzahl Träger oder Munitionsschützen zugeordnet werden. Das Verhältnis der schweren Waffen zu Normaleinheiten muß ebenso bereits kriegsgliederungsmäßig festgelegt werden. Die Mechanisierung erlaubt es jedoch demgegenüber, z.B. schwere Waffen und Munition durch die Fahrzeuge bis in die Stellung bringen zu lassen. Der Munitionsnachschub ist sehr erleichtert, die Gepäckfrage kein Problem."
("The 3 basic problems
Mechanisation means the ability to use all weapons from the vehicle. Mechanisation does not mean to give up the ability to fight in all modes when dismounted. The harmonic fusion of both abilities is the aim of the development. It's obvious that mounted combat and dismounted combat differ very substantially. The former is very similar to the way of combat of main battle tanks and mostly happens in close cooperation with these.
All reasonings about the purposeful structure of mechanised infantry thus has to be based on the structure of main battle tank formations. Thus three main problems appear:
First, according to experiences mechanised combat does in principle lead to a square organisation, while the triangular organisation has proven itself for dismounted combat. Tank combat happens with pincers and chessboard-like, the formations need to be dispersed across the entire battlefield to exploit the space and to create reserves does not play the same role as in dismounted combat or on the defence.
Second, mechanised combat is primarily offensive combat. The organisational element of heavy support weapons such as heavy machinegun units is not needed for this.Its furthermore possible to equip infantry fighting vehicles with a large quantity of machineguns as vehicle weapons. Dedicated HMG units for mounted combat are thus dispensable.
Both problems neutralise each other if one keeps the square structure for mechanised combat and assigns a hybrid role to the fourth unit. It can act as HMG unit in support of the other three units after a transition to dismounted combat.
The third problem is that the structure and equipment of dismounted troops has to be rather fixated, while mechanised combat allows for a more flexible structure thanks to the equipment with armoured vehicles. All heavy weapons require a certain quantity of porters or munitions gunners in dismounted combat. The relationship between heavy weapons  to normal units has to be fixated in the wartime TO&E. The mechanisation meanwhile allows to move heavy weapons into the firing positions with the vehicles. The resupply with munitions is much easier, and the baggage issue no problem.")
There's a lot of obsolete things in this text, but the quality and obvious intent is remarkable compared to both the professional literature (which hardly ever explains anything and tends to simply present doctrine) and the entertainment literature (which would have neglected the "why?"as well, and the authors would usually not notice such issues at all).

I'll summarise the obviously obsolete things quickly to avoid disinformation;
- modern infantry battalions do not make use of HMG units
- modern mechanised infantry hardly ever uses its weapons while mounted
- modern IFVs hardly ever have multiple machineguns

The chapter still motivates me to write about the triangular/square structure debate after all.
There was a nice article by one of the usual suspects in one of the American journals - sadly I cannot find it again. Essentially, it made the case that a square structure offers much more tactical flexibility.
With a triangular structure you can distribute between left wing, right wing and reserves as follows:
1-1-1 / 2-1-0 / 1-2-0
With a square structure you can do
2-1-1 / 2-2-0 / 1-2-1 / 1-1-2 / 3-1-0 / 1-3-0
(v.Senger-Etterlin counted a triangular structure with a fourth heavy weapons support unit as still triangular, for only the manoeuvre elements are counted, not support elements.)

Much has been debated and written about this for over a hundred years, and I have little if anything to add. What I do want to comment on the issue is that there's a systemic bias in favour of the (nowadays dominant) triangular structure that may have caused us to deviate from a possibly superior square structure.
This bias is that even if you have a square structure based on experiences and reasoning, you may still end up with a triangular structure after a round of cuts. I already wrote that cuts are not necessarily done in a way that optimises efficiency or effectiveness. German mechanised infantry battalions even lost their heavy weapons (mortar) company years ago, leaving them with nothing in between 40 mm grenades and 155 mm divisional artillery in terms of high angle fires and even no brigade-organic high angle fires above 40 mm.

Neither any high ranking officer jobs nor any headquarters need be cut when battalions are changed from square to triangular structure in a round of cuts. Divisional and even army organisational structure charts still look the same, with identical quantities of battalions, for nothing changes at the formation level. It's only units (and possibly small units) that are cut if you reduce from four to three companies.

It's difficult if not impossible for an individual to make a case that the seemingly collective wisdom of professionals has lead to a wrong result based on pro and contra points only. Yet it's a fairly powerful tool to identify suspected inefficiencies based on looking at biases. Theories of bureaucracies can help in this, and this blog post showed another way.


P.S.: In case you consider blogging; blogging doesn't need to be super time-consuming. I wrote this blog post in 70 minutes after occasionally thinking about the two main topics covered. Originally, I meant to describe more categories of mil literature, but that may become a different topic sometime.


Smedley Butler: "War is a Racket"

"War is a racket" by Major General Smedley D. Butler is an antiwar classic by a highly decorated U.S. Marine Cops officer. There's still a USMC base in Japan named for this officer.

One quote of this remarkable officer sums his experience up, but isn't from his "War is a racket" text itself:

MG Smedley D. Butler, USMC, 1920's
I spent 33 years and four months in active military service and during that period I spent most of my time as a high class muscle man for Big Business, for Wall Street and the bankers. In short, I was a racketeer, a gangster for capitalism. I helped make Mexico and especially Tampico safe for American oil interests in 1914. I helped make Haiti and Cuba a decent place for the National City Bank boys to collect revenues in. I helped in the raping of half a dozen Central American republics for the benefit of Wall Street. I helped purify Nicaragua for the International Banking House of Brown Brothers in 1902-1912. I brought light to the Dominican Republic for the American sugar interests in 1916. I helped make Honduras right for the American fruit companies in 1903. In China in 1927 I helped see to it that Standard Oil went on its way unmolested. Looking back on it, I might have given Al Capone a few hints.
The horrors of war, the unjustified profits of the war industry, the suffering at home, mutilated soldiers and especially his experience in many needless and corrupt small wars convinced MG Butler that war is a racket and evil. I read his book several times, and it's obviously applicable to our time as well as to the early and late 20th century.

He judged by his personal experience of his lifetime - the "Great War" and many small interventions against sovereign nations in Latin America.

He wrote "War is a racket" in 1935, in hindsight probably one of the worst times ever if you want to have lasting impact and fame for an anti-war work . The axis powers didn't allow peace for long any more (he warned only about Italy in his book) and showed that there are two kinds of war; those you can avoid and those you cannot avoid without submission.

This distinction is very important if we try to apply lessons learned from history for a better future.
Patriotism is a good thing if used to mobilize for unavoidable wars, and it's evil if it gets exploited to reinforce support for needless wars.
Furthermore, the arguments of pacifists should not be dismissed completely, but considered for each and every war in detail - they apply to some wars and not so much to others.

Not only the understanding of patriotism should be influenced by past experiences - the whole approach to war needs to be checked. Are our societies really prepared to repel attempts to lure us into needless small or major wars in the future? Or will we fall prey to such attempts as the British did in 2003, when their head of government was able to participate in a war that the majority of the British didn't even want and that turned into a disaster?

P.S.: It's worth repeating.


The truth is never offensive


"It's weird because America is the kind of place where someone can get more offended at you calling them a racist than at the fact that they are racist. And that's become like a new thing that I stumbled across. How dare you call me a racist? How dare you be a racist? And that's the world that Donald Trump is in. People try to trap you into being afraid of saying what the person is doing as opposed to them acknowledging the world that they're living in"

I noticed this in American-dominated internet forums as well. So moderator thinks I was offensive by calling someone a liar? Does Moderator pretend that the exposed lie in itself wasn't offensive? The truth is never offensive where I live.

This twisting of (quasi)political discourse may be an important ingredient in at least one path towards destruction of a liberal society, destruction of democracy. It may be the path that leads to policy based on fake news.



Brutes in warfare

This is another attempt to draw on military history to provide insights for military theory.

Every now and then - often spaced by centuries - some "new" way of doing war proves disastrously superior, often creating empires or destroying existing ones. Not all such innovations (or revivals of long-known ways) have been coined by superior finesse. Sometimes the secret of success is rather that a brutish, savage approach to warfare proves superior to cautious, limited if not ritualised forms of warfare.

One such example was the success of probably the greatest warlord of all times*, Shaka Zulu. The paradigm that he faced emphasised javelins and long spears. The changed this by emphasising bigger shield and shorter spear, waiting for the javelin hail to end and then charging to a merciless melée. There was no mercy for the defeated; they either joined him or died, which enabled him to grow his army through victories.

Alexander the Great's** extremism in warfare came as a shock to existing realms and his savage treatment of Tyre ensured that hardly any other walled settlement dared to resist him later. His heavy cavalry charges aimed to slay the opposing king instead of defeating his army came as quite a shock, too.

There are more examples, but covering the whole facet of the history of war would go towards a history Ph.d. so, here's instead my suspicion:

There may be a systemic possibility that a new paradigm appears once warfare becomes too ritualised, too focused on avoiding close-up brutality, too focused on limiting the devastating effects of warfare. This new paradigm may change power balances and destroy realms.

The obvious question for a concerned observer is thus whether we might be in such a vulnerable, probably doomed paradigm.

The potential is certainly present if the entire pattern holds true:
  1. the dominance of cabinet wars with minor mobilisation. As a militarist he was unsurpassed, even
  2. the refusal to use nukes***
  3. the casualty aversion
  4. the idea that support fires can do the job before one is overrun by a more aggressively manoeuvering opponent****

Humans are used to expect a continuation of the past, not a repeat of sudden changes that occurred in the distant past. It's all-natural to not expect dictatorships that lasted for generations to suddenly disintegrate, to not expect a financial market boom to end tomorrow - or to expect a paradigm change in warfare that's not a mere jump forward on the road that's been taken for generations.


*: That's no compliment. The guy turned nuts. He's also one of the greatest militarists in history, along with Lycurgus of Sparta.
**: What a fag. ;-)
***: And this was no criticism.
****: There are no support fires if there are no sufficient radio comms. How would a 90% indoctrinated infantry & 10% radio jammers army fare in East-Central Europe against a 15% combat troops & 85% support troops army?


"NATO in Europe needs 'military Schengen' to rival Russian mobility"


When Hodges, on the other hand, wants to move tanks or other heavy vehicles and weaponry across Europe, he needs to stop at every national - sometimes regional - border and deal with unique controls.
"I think most people would be astounded to find out what we have to do," he said, "to submit a list of all the vehicles, the drivers, what's in every truck - which they don't do with gigantic commercial trucks moving back and forth across borders."
He says in many European countries, it takes weeks to get the permission to move through. In Germany every state requires its own procedure.

I think I wrote this myself (and had someone else mocking me because he thought that there's no such red tape), but I don't know when or where.



Overlapping territorial sovereignty

There are two secession referendums almost at the same time, a good opportunity to finally write about an old idea of mine.

The core problem with a secession is in my opinion the instinct of the central government that loses power. It loses power over its supposedly own people, which makes its insistence unsympathetic.

It would be most desirable to find a way how poorly-devised borders could be redrawn peacefully and how to govern areas with very much fractured population effectively, peacefully and well.

example: Bosnia ethnic map in 1991. There was no obvious right way of drawing a border.
(c) Milan1237

another example: linguistic map of Iran
One way how people in a fractured region can live together is that one group or a coalition of groups dominates the region, with undesirable oppression of one or several other groups. That's a powder keg if the oppressed minorities are large enough, as can be seen in former Yugoslavia, in Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan.

Another way is proportionate representation. One group always gets the head of state office, another group always gets the head of government office, another group always gets the head of parliament office and so on. Minorities could also have political privileges, such as the Danish minority in Germany close to the Danish border.

I'd like propose a different way, one that might ease it for the central government to give up (some) control:

The classic idea of a state includes the concept of well-determined borders. These may be in dispute or poorly marked, but there's always the claim of unlimited sovereignty over a certain area on this planet. It's sometimes simply not possible to draw "correct" borders on a map without previous ethnic cleansing. So we need to give up this exclusive sovereignty concept if we want sustainable political order without oppression and without ethnic cleansing in the very ethnically fragmented areas of this world.

Think about a simple model: There are the countries A, B and C with corresponding ethnicities a, b and c. The ethnicity c lives in state C, but the states A and B have a dispute about a region where a and b live intermingled.

Now my proposal is to create a shared sovereignty over this area of intermingled ethnicities. The a people pay taxes to A and have an A passport, b do the same with B. Affairs between a and a would be settled by A (civil and criminal) law, affairs between b and b would be settled by B law. Affairs between a and b, a and c or b and c in the intermingled area would be settled by AB consensus law (devised by the political system of the population in the intermingled AB area with veto right for both A and B).
An attack of C against A would lead to A defending itself with a resources. An attack of C on B would lead to B defending itself with b resources. An attack of C on the intermingled AB territory would lead to A and B fighting back with a and b resources respectively.

Additionally, there should be an effort to emphasise programmatic politics in the AB area; the people should be divided in politics by left/right or other ideologies, not by ethnic divisions.
This model can be applied in regard to a secession as well. A secession  of a region would only happen if the regional majority ethnicity isn't the same as the ethnicity that dominates the central government. Thus there would be no veto necessary to protect that regional majority ethnicity, while the region's minority ethnicity would still enjoy minority protection through the former central government's veto right.

This is far from the traditional idea of how states work, but that traditional idea serves poorly in areas with intermingled populations. So mankind should keep looking for better ways of governance.



The Kurdish referendum


There's a problem with the referendum, and as usual much of the media did a terrible job at shining light on it*:

The wording of the referendum question appears to be (translated):
"Do you want the Kurdistan region and the Kurdistani areas outside the region’s administration to become an independent state?"

Now that's bad if it's the correct translation. They asked a small portion of Kurds, but the referendum seems to support claims on Turkish, Iranian and Syrian territories (so far I have seen no claims that the referendum was held in Syria) as well. Even to someone who's supporting the right of peoples to self-determination over the survival of existing borders that's troublesome. No group or state should ever lay claims on another state's territory. The Turkish, Iranian and Syrian Kurds may gain the right to secede on their own, Iraqi Kurds cannot create such a claim for them.

Kurdish settlement areas (not a Kurdish majority in all marked areas)

It's regrettable that the question wasn't limited to the Kurdish region in Iraq, for now Turkey, Syria and Iran actually have a good case for opposing the Iraqi Kurds. Now they can paint them as aggressive.

It may remain without significance because the four countries oppose the Kurds anyway and just about everyone appears to have picked a side or seems unlikely to ever pick a side, of course.

- - - - -

The Catalan independence referendum on October 1 is going to be extremely interesting. Imagine they pull it off and a majority votes for independence with a high turnout. This would be extremely interesting for Europeans. On the one hand the governments in Europe would not want conflict with the Spanish government, on the other hand there was the Kosovo precedent and generally lots of good arguments for Catalan freedom (if and once they vote for independence).
Some of the top politicians - including Merkel - are not psychologically prepared for this. Merkel doesn't really shape things. She's an administrator of the status quo policies who does u-turns on certain policies when the pressure can be expected to reach a breaking point soon anyway. She has no idea of what way the EU should head in the question of secession movements that are firmly opposed by their central governments.


*: I'm not bashing the media in right wing "fake news!" style there. I'm disgusted by the huge difference between journalists' high opinion of themselves and the actual quality of their output.


Presentation on tanks by Hilmes

This is a presentation of Rolf Hilmes (German tank 'pope' - equivalent to Ogorkiewicz) on post-WW2 tank technology (all in German):

This reinforces my impression that I spent too much time soaking up military-related info. I could have held about 95% of this presentation ad hoc. The details on M-48 fire control and the T-14's X-engine were the most notable things that I wouldn't have remembered.



A quick take on tanks

I found an old comment of mine at TD and decided to recycle it:

The problem is the price [of main battle tanks]. The technology of a MBT is approaching the technology of an AH-64E attack helicopter, and partially going [beyond] it.
There’s a point where people simply need to re-learn that tanks are valuable and can be decisive in battle even while suffering atrocious losses. The attempt to keep tanks alive by making them ever more expensive is likely doomed. The art will be to determine which features belong into a MBT and which are excess luxury.
The existence of weapons and munitions that can penetrate any surface of a MBT doesn’t make that MBT obsolete in itself. German tanks of 1939-1941 were merely bulletproofed – every single anti-tank gun, field gun, howitzer and tank gun was able to penetrate them at useful distances. That was the time of [the German tanks'] greatest successes. Later on some of them became almost impervious – and successes were localised.
During the 1960’s Germany developed the Leopard, which was not built to high protection standards. Instead, mobility, maintenance, durability, ergonomics, command and good firepower were emphasised. [The (probably excessive)] emphasis on protection stems from the 70’s when Burlington/Chobham armour renewed hope for balanced tanks that were [impenetrable in their] frontal 60°.

I deem it worth repeating.


[Fun] Boys never change


(The upper picture is from '44 or '45, but yeah.)


Hard body armour: A possible compromise

I wrote enough about the folly of hard body armour in conventional warfare in a pre-powered-exoskeleton world. It's simply too heavy - the users are slowed down, exhausted and the necessary endurance, speed and agility is lost.

Radical positions are rarely correct, and also rarely followed. There's usually a majority preference for compromise, and even more so when intuition/feelings are biased against the radical proposal. Thus let's look at what might be a sensible compromise about body armour.

The current typical HE munitions still allow for a sensible role for about 2-3 kg heavy torso-protecting 'flak vests', which provide but the lowest level of fragmentation protection to stop the weakest about 80% or so fragments (more where the impact angle is a good one). Such vests are not "bulletproof" except against some weak pocket pistols with lead bullets.

Example distribution for an old HE shell (no preformed fragments, no internal serrations to control the fragmentation pattern):
0.1-1.0 g: 77% of fragments
1.0-10.0 g: 21% of fragments
10.0 -1 40.0 g: 1% of fragments.

To stop all but the heaviest 1% of fragments would require a NIJ level IIIa vest (the highest grade that's still soft body armour) that weigh several kilograms more, and even then it would only protect at a considerable distance to the explosion (way outside of the lethal blast radius).
Still, that's one possibility for a compromise between the lightest flak vests and the 15 kg nonsense. Such NIJ level II vests are actually quite common, especially with pouches for the heavy level IV plate inserts.

Another compromise could be the citadel armour principle. Citadel armour was introduce in battleship and battlecruiser design prior to the First World War. It was impossible to harden the whole ship, so the ship designers limited the shell-proofing to the citadel which usually reached from the forwardmost main artillery turret barbette to the rearmost one. This included protection for the boilers and steam machines/turbines as well as for the munition magazines. Everything else got at most thin armour plates meant to mitigate the effect of shell explosions inside, not to keep shells out.

Battleship Yamato armour layout - the citadel is visible
A benefit with citadel armour / all-or-nothing-armour was that armour piercing shells that could still penetrate this citadel armour at too short or too long distances (the 'immunity zone' was a few thousands metres wide) would do little damage in the non-hardened compartments because their explosives load was small compared to SAP or HE shells.

Let's look; where are our human equivalents to munition magazines?

I'm no medical doctor, but to my knowledge the only parts below the lungs and heard that lead to quick death if perforated are the main blood vessels; abdominal aorta, iliac, fermora. A hit in the lower spine would also be bad, for it almost guarantees paralysis of the legs and other discomfort.
Meanwhile, perforations of the lower torso's intestines can lead to death when perforated, but a 500 ml saline solution should in most cases buy enough time that CASEVAC/MEDEVAC and surgery would save the patient AFAIK. This is AFAIK different with the heart and aorta. Lung hits are really bad as well, and lungs are big. The upper spine is also useful.

So I suppose we could define the area above the diaphragm as the citadel area, and the front is much more relevant than the back. That's about half of the area of a 10" x 12" plate.

example of a 10" by 12" plate carrier
Neither is a good representation of relevant bullets, especially if one thinks of indoors combat (urban combat) where machineguns aren't that prominent, while assault rifles are. AP bullets are not as commonly used in assault rifles, but not terribly expensive steel cores are present in many Kalashnikov cartridges (7.62x39 and 5.45x39). I suppose the 7N22 bullet (5.45x39 mm, penetrates about 10 mm RHA at 100 m*) is about the most penetrating bullet that one should care about in regard to body armour until powered exoskeletons become practical and affordable. This threat is in between NIJ levels III and IV.

The "defense" industry has attempted to cover that gap with unofficial "level III+" and "level III++", but did not set its threshold there. Instead, they focused on common 5.56 mm bullets. Still existing III++ plates give an idea of the weight of a citadel armour plate; its weight would be in the 2-3 kg range including protection against excessive blunt trauma and with little multi-hit resistance.

Well, would such a little armour plate be worth its weight? I suppose there may be niches where that's a "yes" (mostly indoors), but even 2 kg can make a huge difference when you have to clear many buildings with many stairs. You'll only get the weight down and be agile if you muster the self-discipline to shave off weight on every opportunity.

There's probably but a weak case for combining both a flak vest and such a single chest plate. The only common fragments indoors are from AP mines, 30 and 40 mm grenade launcher HE/HEDP grenades**, HE/HEDP rifle grenades**, defensive hand grenades and offensive hand grenades with fragmentation sleeve added.
I don't have experiment test results on hand, but I suppose that blast, bullets and effects from large calibre hits from outdoors are the main problems indoors, not those fragments that a vest would stop at 2-4 m distance.

So there may be a case for a spare plate carrier with a single anti-7N22 chest plate (about 500 square cm) that could be worn instead of a nearly identical weight flak vest for indoors missions. This could be grabbed together with other equipment for combat in settlements (fighting in built-up areas / OHK) such as crowbars, collapsible lightweight ladders, demolition equipment for going through walls et cetera. This stuff would/should be stored in the infantry squad's transport vehicle (2 ton 4x4 or APC).


*: Afaik penetration may actually be less than that at very short distance because of vibration issues, but I'm not sure about this.
**: Shot into the building from outside, thus typically hitting the back. Nose-fused HE is then much more dangerous than base-fused HEDP.


When thousands of nukes are no deterrence any more...

I stated several times - including here - that I'm 100% positive that North Korea's little tyrant wouldn't use any nuke against the U.S., its troops or Seoul.
The reasoning is that the entire state of North Korea serves but one purpose at this point; to protect and please the little tyrant and his (direct) line of succession. His death would be guaranteed if he ever used a nuke in anger, even if he fled to the PRC and received asylum there. He'd be killed like UBL sooner or later.

Now there's one most irritating thought; what if Trump in his idiocy managed to shatter the one central and so far absolutely self-evident assumption that's central to the purpose of the nuclear triad? What if he convinced the little tyrant that he'll be killed anyway?

At that point no nukes or thousands of nukes would not make a difference. There would be no deterrence any more.

Idiocracy was not meant to be a instructional video.



Combat resupply

(see update at the end)

Combat tends to consume a lot of munitions, including munitions for direct fire - and those need be carried by either the infantryman or armoured fighting vehicle because let's face it, we collectively dismiss porters and those robodogs are nonsense.

A competent supply NCO in Vietnam was able to get a pallet loaded with all that's needed for utility helicopter airlift to the troops in contact. A very competent supply NCO would pack the stuff before it was asked for because he had the experience and paid attention to the radio chat.

I dismiss such helicopter logistics for European warfare and I dismiss this also for unmanned helicopters such as the K-MAX. Such helicopters are large and expensive enough to be high-enough-value targets for all those systems meant to defeat low-flying manned battlefield helicopters.

There is an alternative that might make sense for the especially weight-sensitive infantry, though:

The problem of resupplying infantry close to opposing forces or even in contact with munitions, medical supplies, hot food, fresh water and batteries might be solvable with rotary cargo drones. The small unit would need to have communicate a suitable landing zone's coordinates and a battalion supply team could send these drones en route (and recover them) with packages of 12-15 kg (it should suffice for the heaviest single relevant piece of equipment, such as an anti-tank guided missile).
The drones would navigate by inertial navigation sensor and could use a directional (downward focused) radio to interrogate another very low emission power radio beacon which would allow for a correction of a navigation error of about 20 m. I suppose (but did not succeed at checking it) that this error correction should suffice to land a drone on a flat roof after 20 km of flight.

The supply crew would recover the drones that landed in their varying supply point landing zones, switch in a charged battery pack, visually inspect for damage, check if the mission log shows any problems and ultimately load it for another delivery.

The drone could be equipped with the necessary sensors (such as LADAR) for flying close above the treetops of woodland to minimise the exposure to hostiles on the ground. Alternatively, they could fly below roof level through streets.

Any sensors but LADAR would necessitate an updating of maps with overland power lines and what maps generated by radar satellites in order to avoid crashes.

Here are some reviews of drones with up to 18 kg payload, that should be the relevant size and could also be used for a tethered sensor drone (almost no battery capacity needed due to cable power supply, no radio needed). Claims for rotary payload drones go up to more than 200 kg payload, but the next threshold after 15 kg should be at about 100 kg, since this would enable casualty and civilians evacuation (at night or complete with red-cross-on-white-cloth bags).

Now why am I not surprised that the big "defense" contractor companies didn't capture the market with this years ago?


edit: My bad, I overlooked this. They think of something like this, but bigger.


Blog layout

Bear with me - I'm trying to renovate this place.

I will create a proper title banner later.
Maybe this year. Maybe not.

four days later: Done. It's an embarrassing display of my lack of artistic creativity.

For comparison: The old background tile
and the old header. I recreated it with new images, ended up with the appropriate width and nothing really new.

I'm no artist.



Infantry agility past and present

Have a look at this, 1:47 min onward:

I didn't look specifically for a video about Germans, but simply one of the many WW2 videos where running infantrymen are shown (I typed in 'infantry attack' in YT and found this as 3rd video), in fact I had hoping for a Bersaglieri film.

The thing that strikes me is how quickly these actors can move (and the effect of a possible acceleration by manipulating camera film speed cannot be great, for such acceleration is usually visible). Their equipment is in the 10-15 kg range in my opinion, and only the machinegunner is at the upper end of that range.

I've seen people moving quickly a lot, of course. It's just that modern Western infantrymen are rarely seen running in action - they're usually much slower than that or run but a short 20-30 m sprint once in a while. I understand that - I'm 20-25 kg heavier now than during my (mostly skinny) Bundeswehr days and I notice my walking changes when I carry 10 kg. It feels different in the feet especially. The feet are signalling me that they would tire out quickly under that load. I myself was never nimble or much inclined to move quickly with a 10-20 kg load.

Let's come back to the Bersaglieri. They are the traditional light infantry of the Italians, and to some degree an elite compared to the regular infantry. They also had (and still to some extent have) an emphasis on speed.

Back in ancient times there was light infantry running next to cavalry if an army leader judged his cavalry wings to be inferior. This cavalry-supporting infantry would join the melee between cavalry and cavalry and often times decide it with their numbers and spears and/or javelins.
There hasn't been many examples of such running infantry for a long time, when the early 19th century Zulus and their still hard to believe endurance at running entered the stage and were documented by the Boers and British.

The Bersaglieri show off their emphasis on running and fitness in the most ludicrous way; they run on parades.

It's hard to take them seriously after watching this, but the attitude may be worth consideration!*

- - - - -

Now a part for Germans:

Ich habe die Sache mit dem Gauland und Stolz in den Nachrichten gesehen. Zitat
„Man muss uns diese 12 Jahre nicht mehr vorhalten. Sie betreffen unsere Identität heute nicht mehr. Und das sprechen wir auch aus.“ & „Wenn die Franzosen zu Recht stolz auf ihren Kaiser sind und die Briten auf Nelson und Churchill, haben wir das Recht, stolz zu sein auf die Leistungen deutscher Soldaten in zwei Weltkriegen.“
Ich fände es dümmlich wenn es nicht eine offensichtlich absichtliche Provokation wäre. Zudem ist es, was Amerikaner eine "dog whistle" nennen; etwas im Wortlaut Unverfängliches sagen, bei dem man davon ausgehen kann, dass es eine bestimmte Klientel in einer bestimmten anderen Bedeutung interpretiert. Es ist eine Art minimale plausible Dementierbarkeit, die dann aber doch fast jeder durchschaut.
Die zwei Sätze des Zitates stehen ohnehin in Dissonanz zueinander; entweder da ist eine starke Verbindung oder eben nicht. Wenn da keine starke Verbindung ist, dann wäre Stolz ein Schmücken mit fremden Federn.
Aber "das Recht" stolz zu sein hat jeder, ob's Sinn macht ist eine ganz andere Frage.

Ich finde es dümmlich, stolz sein zu wollen auf das, was andere mal getan haben oder nicht. Man kann sich an dem was andere getan haben erfreuen, man kann sie bewundern, aber stolz sein sollte man nur auf eigene Leistungen oder auf den eigenen Nachwuchs (was dann doch wieder ein Stolz auf die eigene Erziehungsleistung ist).
Dementsprechend verwende ich historische Videos zum deutschen Militär usw. wohl fast nur deshalb über das statistisch Wahrscheinliche hinaus, weil es eben sprachlich naheliegt oder in der Sache begründet liegt.


*: I myself hate running, but it's not essential to anything I do these days.


Daesh is finished

Just to state the obvious; my expectation that the strategic idiots of daesh will defeated themselves by turning just about everyone into an enemy has come true. They're in control of a road and a mere two towns in Syria as of today.


It didn't work out for Napoleon, it didn't work out for Hitler. Only the Asian steppe people from Huns to Mongols were able to afford having that many enemies because their strategic mobility was far superior, and they could (usually) deal with them one after the other.* "AQ" had such strategic mobility, but being a mere movement fashion they had their up and down, and have become irrelevant.

I never understood why everyone got so agitated about daesh. They were guaranteed to lose and frankly, they were and are the problem of the Syrians and Iraqis. The supposedly daesh-aligned criminals in Europe merely picked the asswipe fashion du jour, and would have most likely have picked some asswipe fashion regardless of daesh's existence anyway. There was never a real link between bombing daesh and criminals in Europe, nor between bombing daesh and daesh ultimately losing. The bombing may have hastened daesh's downfall while also helping daesh to recruit more idiots, though.



*: The Huns were finally stopped when they had so many footmen allies, captured cattle and booty with them that the West Romans and Visigoths were able to fight them unitedly.


The math of war or peace

A proper equation for determining whether to go to war or not would look approximately like this:
 (An egoistical decisionmaker would go to war if the equation is true.)

I didn't get the formula right 100%, but I suppose it's close enough to convey the idea.  This calculation is impossible to make, for one cannot even imagine all possible scenarios, much less determine their probability and weigh them accordingly. The human brain simply doesn't work like that, it's more fuzzy. We're led by feelings and guesses. Some philosopher once called it the ultimate insult to humans that it's actually our subconsciousness that's in total control of our actions. Our consciousness is more like a commenter. We can consciously understand that decisionmaking would be optimal if we calculated some formula such as the one above, but then our subconsciousness simply does something, whatever that may be.

This is a curious thing, for I suspect that the equation that's really in use is an entirely different one, a two-variable equation. Something close to this:

with Z being between 0 and 1 and representing the decisionmaker's attitude towards risk (risk aversion, risk neutrality or risk taking behaviour).

Maybe some research into this by psychologists and game theorists could provide clarity (honestly, I did not do a dedicated literature research on this beforehand, but I found nothing like this in literature yet).

This could explain a lot (especially the observable marginal importance of costs of warfare on many decisionmakers), and it could clarify a lot for deterrence policies. There would be but two variables that matter; probability of military defeat and the decisionmaker's risk aversion. The problem with aggressors is that the potential defender would most rarely be able to pick the potential aggressor's decisionmaker, of course. Maybe that's why almost everyone seems to emphasise the probability of military success or defeat so very much.



The changing battlefield air defence (II)

Part I of this series showed how technological progress led to radical changes and how important the effective ceiling difference between light and heavy AAA or (V)ShoRAD and area air defences were.

This time I'll argue that it's become more complicated. The rise of missiles with much more autonomous seekers especially since the 90's (examples AIM-120, MICA, Aster, R-77 - the earlier AIM-54 did not trigger much) brought lock-on after launch (LOAL) into the air war repertoire.

This is hugely important in many ways, but one is of special interest: Nowadays the missile launcher unit does not need a line of sight  to the target or even only the point of intercept any more. It suffices if it gets targeting data that was generated based on distant sensors (networked warfare). The USN demonstrated this (quite late - it should have been possible two decades earlier) with a SM-6 missile that was launched based on aircraft (E-2D or F-35) targeting data only, not using any of the launching ship's sensors.

This unhinges the old two-layered air defence just as much as the advance in airborne ground targeting sensors (imaging infrared, imaging radar) in the 1980's: (V)ShoRAD simply doesn't protect much any more. Well-equipped hostile air power could engage ground targets effectively with impunity. Meanwhile, area air defences with LOAL capability combined with airborne (or land-based forward and thus line-of sight) targeting sensors could defend not only against those ShoRAD-immune threats, but also engage non-line of sight targets (such as aircraft and especially helicopters at very low altitude) that were previously the prey of (V)ShoRAD only.

This leads to two divergent paths for battlefield air defences:

(1) Missile launcher forward, airborne targeting sensor

An AEW aircraft of fighter provides the targeting info, and a mere missile launch container or rack on a vehicle platform with manoeuvre land forces (such as a mechanised battalion battlegroup) provides the LOAL missile with enough chemical energy for area air defence and a high effective ceiling.
The weakness of this approach is in the questionable air support; AEW aircraft could be destroyed or pushed too far back, and fighters would hardly be on station and facing the right direction (few have more than 180° radar field of view) much of the time. Land forces with inadequate air power support - that is, exactly the ones in need of battlefield air defences against manned combat aviation - would find such means of targeting to be unreliable.
The hostile air power on the other hand would still face great risks engaging such land forces, as the network of airborne radar and forward missile launcher would be intact at times and unpredictably so.

(2) Sensor forward, missile launcher more or less "behind"

This is a relevant scenario when you look at a smaller scale. The previous path was interesting with a network of hundreds of kilometres expanse. This second path is rather about the difference between forces rather close to the launcher. A battalion battlegroup or even entire brigade from a country with a poor military budget (such as Romanian land forces, for example) could fight alongside a much better-funded brigade. The low budget force could then use highly survivable sensors (say, Rheinmetall FIRST, RAFAEL Helispot or SAAB Giraffe 1X with on-the-move activity) to provide targeting data and the neighbouring force could use its stocks of expensive LOAL area air defence missiles to protect its brothers-in-arms. Armoured recce and irregulars that operate around a well-budgeted brigade could also benefit from such an air defence umbrella if only they have what it takes to provide good-enough and trusted targeting data.

the old-school (once rather gold-plated) Gepard SPAAG
Germany got rid of its Gepard SPAAG and its Roland battlefield point defence missile systems years ago, and the renewed attention on the actual constitutional mission of defence has led to a renewed interest in battlefield air defence. There are even some bureaucratic requirements; as least some forces need at least a fig leaf of battlefield air defences, and the leftovers of 1980's Stinger stocks are not taken seriously any more (that is, if they exist in Germany at all any more).

There are enough nostalgic people who think of reintroducing Gepard or introducing something similar to Tunguska. There's (justifiably) very little love for the puny LeFlaSys Ozelot which depends on mere ManPADS even though it has a better effective range and ceiling than a 35 mm gun.

I think these thoughts of reviving the 1970's and 1980's concept of battlefield air defences are nonsense. To do such a thing would be wasteful, and if we did it we should at the very least use a less easily-countered guidance principle; laser beam riding (RBS 70 NG with Bolide missile). But such (V)ShoRAD systems have tiny niches nowadays; mostly short exposure targets of opportunity (mostly battlefield helicopters) and keeping low quality air threats at a safe distance. They could also be used by armoured recce to besiege hostile forward air bases (harassing hostile aircraft on their landing approach). These niches are why I mentioned them as a ShoRAD solution for budget brigades.

Radar-equipped LOAL missiles tend to be expensive, and seem to keep becoming more expensive. I wouldn't be surprised if the AMRAAM-ER costs USD 1.5 million per copy even if Germany ordered 1,500 such missiles. (That would be still acceptable if it achieves a mere 10% kill probability against combat aircraft in wartime conditions!) Infrared sensor LOAL missiles such as IRIS-T SL offer much less range (thus also much less ceiling) and are much more questionable for look-down engagements (against very low altitude targets, for example), so their somewhat lower price makes them attractive as complements (also in order to achieve redundancy of guidance principles), but they cannot protect nearly as much as a well-functioning and (hopefully) not-yet countered AMRAAM-ER could protect.
Anyway; all LOAL missiles are awfully expensive and in my opinion too expensive for poorly funded land forces. Countries such as Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Romania, Greece, Portugal, Belgium, Czech Republic and Slovakia should prioritise other equipment and should be able to expect some support from their allies in this regard.

I think the way to go for a rather well-funded European army such as the Heer is to have a multi-role brigade radar, but to not depend on it for battlefield air defence. Other (infrared, infrasound) sensors should complement it and the brigade should have rocket launchers with area air defence LOAL missiles (AMRAAM-ER would fit the bill) to project a sizeable battlefield air defence umbrella that can even protect less well-funded brothers in arms nearby. This was all about manned air threats and comparably expensive air targets, of course. There's more to air defences.



edit: For clarification I'd like to add that I do not mean missiles such as Patriot, ESSM Blk I or SM-2 as "LOAL" missiles. Such missiles lock on their target sometimes long after launch, but they have no ability to lock on targets that are not in line of sight to an illuminator radar - that's a huge problem with their SARH guidance.